Economies facing similar environmental challenges and broadly comparable policy interventions can nevertheless follow very different green-transition paths: some quickly adopt clean technologies, while others remain locked into carbon-intensive production. To account for this puzzle, we develop an evolutionary model in which market selection between clean and dirty technologies coevolves with environmental policy. A welfare-maximizing regulator taxes emissions and allocates the revenues between current pollution abatement and investments that progressively improve the environmental performance of clean production. This links short-run environmental policy with long-run technological change. We characterize the possible long-run technological regimes and study their evolutionary stability. We find that the same policy stance can support multiple stable long-run outcomes: economies facing identical policies may converge to different regimes depending on their initial technological composition, providing a theoretical basis for understanding the observed heterogeneity across countries. We show that policy can promote innovation even when only dirty producers are active, thereby paving the way for a green transition. We also show that even a predominantly green economy may remain vulnerable to the re-entry of dirty technologies. Finally, we analyze the ability of a regulator to dynamically adapt the policy mix, in order to redirect the transition path toward a predetermined long-run environmental target. Although adaptive policies can mitigate lock-in and path dependence, they cannot completely eliminate them. Finally, simulations show that more stringent environmental targets may even lead to outcomes opposite to those intended because of scale effects.
Cavalli, F., Mainini, A., Moretto, E., Naimzada, A. (2026). Understanding heterogeneous green transitions: An evolutionary approach to policy, innovation, and technological change. ENERGY ECONOMICS, 163 [10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109633].
Understanding heterogeneous green transitions: An evolutionary approach to policy, innovation, and technological change
Cavalli, Fausto
;Mainini, Alessandra;Moretto, Enrico;Naimzada, Ahmad
2026
Abstract
Economies facing similar environmental challenges and broadly comparable policy interventions can nevertheless follow very different green-transition paths: some quickly adopt clean technologies, while others remain locked into carbon-intensive production. To account for this puzzle, we develop an evolutionary model in which market selection between clean and dirty technologies coevolves with environmental policy. A welfare-maximizing regulator taxes emissions and allocates the revenues between current pollution abatement and investments that progressively improve the environmental performance of clean production. This links short-run environmental policy with long-run technological change. We characterize the possible long-run technological regimes and study their evolutionary stability. We find that the same policy stance can support multiple stable long-run outcomes: economies facing identical policies may converge to different regimes depending on their initial technological composition, providing a theoretical basis for understanding the observed heterogeneity across countries. We show that policy can promote innovation even when only dirty producers are active, thereby paving the way for a green transition. We also show that even a predominantly green economy may remain vulnerable to the re-entry of dirty technologies. Finally, we analyze the ability of a regulator to dynamically adapt the policy mix, in order to redirect the transition path toward a predetermined long-run environmental target. Although adaptive policies can mitigate lock-in and path dependence, they cannot completely eliminate them. Finally, simulations show that more stringent environmental targets may even lead to outcomes opposite to those intended because of scale effects.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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