The “Science” in “The Science of Value”

This article examines the philosophy of science underpinning Michael Heinrich’s case for a “monetary theory of value” in “The Science of Value” (“Die Wissenschaft vom Wert”). Heinrich argues that Marx’s labour theory of value is compromised by persistent ambiguities arising from a residual continuity with classical political economy. To address these limitations, Heinrich draws on Louis Althusser’s concept of epistemological “breaks”, contending that genuine scientific advancement requires a transformation of the prevailing “theoretical field”. While this framework allows Heinrich to present Marx’s theory as a scientific revolution, it also introduces a central epistemological problem: the incommensurability between old and new theoretical fields precludes the positive demonstration of the new theory’s scientific superiority. The article concludes that Heinrich’s framework, while valuable in rethinking Marx’s theory of value, ultimately reproduces the circularity it seeks to overcome by relying on internal coherence without providing external criteria of scientificity.